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Abstract:  I defend the claim that there is a necessary connection between 
law and ethics. I do so by analogy with other social rule-based systems, 
such as capitalism.  Most social rule-based systems are (in part) 
conceptually understood by the collective overall content of their rules.  If 
legal systems, which are also social rule-based systems, are best 
understood in the same way, then the collective overall content of legal 
systems’ rules tells us how to understand the concept of law.  One 
possibility for the collective overall content of legal systems’ rules is 
ethical content.  If so, then there is a necessary connection between law 
and ethics.  
Introduction  
Imagine a law was passed that allowed each of us to murder one person a year.  Society 
may persist, but such a law would be unethical.  Or imagine a law was made that required 
that we calculate punishment, in general, in terms of the monetary cost to society.  For 
example, if you murder person R and R made $100,000 a year, then the punishment 
should be proportionate to the cost society will face upon the loss of R’s monetary 
contributions (i.e. R held a job that contributed so well to society that it was worth paying 
such a high salary).  Homeless persons do not contribute anything like monetary benefits 
to society, but we would still want to severely punish those who murder homeless 
persons.1  In fact, not only is this a bad result, it seems to be in tension with what we 
think the purpose of law is: justice or ethics.   
                                                 
1 Or consider the possibility of a law allowing for justifications for punishment that allow serious crimes to 
go nearly unpunished.  It has been suggested that we can calculate how much punishment to administer 
based on the following: ‘the harm of the punishment to the criminal must be greater than the expected 
profit of each offense divided by the perceived probably of punishment’ (Schauer & Sinnott-Armstrong 
1996: 670). So if the perceived likelihood of punishment is .5 and the perceived benefit of the crime is 
making $1000, then you must make the punishment greater than $2000 (or $500 if you divide by half, the 
specifics don’t matter).  However, if a psychopath murdered someone in order to alleviate boredom for an 
hour, then there is a low perceived benefit.  But we would not want to lower the punishment because of this 
(nor in any other case of ‘irrational’ justifications perceived by the criminal).  One reason to believe we 
should keep the punishment high is due to ethical motivations behind the law and that murder is unethical.   
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The above intuitions have played a role in the debate on whether an unjust law is 
a law.  Historically, these issues have been seen by many as confusion between the law as 
it is and how it ought to be.  Of course, the distinction between law as it is and how it 
ought to be is compatible with necessary connections between law and ethics.  For 
example, Green (2008: 1050-52) argues law is necessarily ‘justice-apt’ and Gardner 
(2012a), following Raz and Alexy, argues that law necessarily makes moral claims.2  
Whatever one might think about the necessary connection between law and ethics, in 
general, there does seem to be something confused about a legal system that allows for 
justifying punishment in the way noted above and for laws to allow for occasional 
murder.   That is, while they may well be laws if enacted, one might think the society is 
confused in some way about law.  I’ll argue that while the rules in the above scenarios 
may be laws (if enacted), they still undermine a legal system as a legal system, which I 
explicate throughout this paper.   
I’ll argue that there is a necessary connection between the concepts of law and 
ethics.  I will motivate the claim that the concept of social rule-based (or ‘rule-governed’ 
in Hart’s phrasing) systems are, in part (because there are other necessary features) and 
necessarily, correctly understood by the collective overall content of their rules.3  For 
example, if it were the case that the country’s economic rules were followed they would 
then guide the economy towards building economic wealth, then that economy is 
correctly conceptualized as a wealth-increasing system and correctly labeled ‘capitalist’ 
(assuming other necessary features of capitalist are present, e.g. the means of production 
                                                 
2 Shapiro (2011: 391) claims law has an ethical purpose. 
3 ‘Collective’ is used to indicate explicitly that I am talking about all the laws taken together.  Without 
‘collective’, ‘overall ethical content’ may just refer to individual laws’ overall ethical content.   
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are held privately).  If the rules of the country’s economy did not result in an economy 
that was guided towards building wealth if the rules were followed, we would not 
correctly conceptualize the economy as wealth-building and labeling that economy as 
‘capitalist’.  We expect this system, and one’s like it, to produce certain kinds of results 
(e.g. building of capital) if the rules are followed.   
If law is conceptually understood analogously, then the collective overall content 
of the rules will provide us with the correct way to partly and necessarily conceptualize 
law.  If the rules have, collectively, overall ethical content, then there is a necessary 
connection between the concepts of law and ethics.  That is, if the rules of the supposed 
legal system were followed, then they would produce overall ethical behavior.  In that 
case, there is a necessary connection between law and ethics.  Or so I will argue.  
Moreover, since the conceptual understanding of law according to this view is based on 
the collective overall content of laws themselves, it would seem to be a descriptive view, 
at least if the analogy holds and the conceptual understandings of the analogous social 
rule-based systems are descriptive. 
A quick note on how I will use the word ‘content’.  When I speak of the ‘content’ 
of rules, I am discussing what kind of code the rules are designed to enforce, what kind of 
normativity they are meant to govern.  Legal rules are norms.  For example, to say that 
the content of a law is ethical is to say that the law, when followed, guides people to act 
ethically, even if a reading of the law does not obviously indicate its ethical content in the 
way a law banning murder does.  A law may not contain ethical language but still have 
ethical content since it may, if followed, result in ethical behavior (e.g. procedural laws 
can be written without ethical language, but still ensure fair trials).  A law which bans 
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murder and allows the state to punish those who break it has ethical content since, if 
followed, it would produce ethical behavior.  On the other hand, a law requiring one to 
murder has unethical content since, if followed, it results in unethical behavior. 
Given that people may not follow a rule, the content of it should not be 
understood in terms of the actual behavior of people.  For example, we may have laws 
prohibiting theft, but people may steal repeatedly.  This does not mean the content of the 
rule is not ethically good or that it does not prohibit stealing.  So, the content of a rule 
should be understood in terms of the kinds of results it would produce if it were followed.  
We may understand the ethical content of a law as follows:  
A law has ethical content iff one must commit an action Y in order to comply with 
a law X, where ‘Y’ stands in for an ethical behavior.   
If ‘Y’ designates a good behavior (e.g. refraining from stealing or murder), then X has 
ethically good content, and if not, then X does not have ethically good content. 
The view I will develop is a sketch.  Due to the limitations of a single paper, I 
cannot fully develop the analogy I will propose, nor provide absolute certainty that law 
has collective overall ethical content.  There are many other issues that merit attention.  
Instead, I will defend a much more modest thesis that is meant to support the view while 
providing the scope the thesis has, if true, on related issues.  The argument in support of 
the view supports the following conditional: if the analogy is correct, and legal systems’ 
rules have, collectively, overall ethical content, then there is a necessary connection 
between law and ethics.  I will not defend the truth of the antecedents, though I will 
explain why one may hold them.  I am instead more interested in explicating the 
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consequent.  That is, the paper is more interested in explaining a view and its 
implications, rather than asserting its truth.  Keep in mind; the collective overall ethical 
content of the rules of a legal system is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for there 
to be a legal system, on this view.  Other criteria, such as rules of adjudication and 
change, are necessary as well.   
Since legal positivism is compatible with the claim that there is a necessary 
connection between law and ethics (Gardner 2001: 222-25), the necessary connection 
proposed here may well be compatible as well.  Nevertheless, the necessary connection is 
problematic for some doctrines typically held by the positivist.  Legal positivists view the 
existence of law as a social fact instituted through convention that can be fully described 
without the need for any ethical evaluations.  As such, they tend to believe, roughly, that 
(1) the existence of law does not depend on law’s (collective overall) ethical content and 
(2) that whether or not a rule is a valid law does not depend on that rule’s ethical content.  
The view outlined in this paper is inconsistent with (1) and, while not strictly inconsistent 
with (2), does entail—for the same reason it is inconsistent with (1)—that the collective 
overall ethical content (or lack thereof) of laws does determine whether or not the rules 
are laws and, so, valid laws.   
 I will first discuss the analogy between various social rule-based systems.  Next, I 
will motivate the claim that legal systems’ rules have, collectively, overall ethical 
content.  I will respond throughout to various complications, such as how the view 
responds to the issue of legal validity and discuss the implications the view has for law.  
Ultimately, I provide a plausible and coherent view supporting the claim that there is a 
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necessary connection between law and ethics based on the collective overall content of 
legal systems’ rules. 
Social Rule-Based Systems and Concepts 
I next develop what part of the concept of various social rule-based systems is.  I argue 
that part of the concept of social rule-based systems is the collective overall content of 
their rules.  I will then suggest that if legal systems should be understood analogously, 
then law is (partly and necessarily) understood by the collective overall content of its 
rules.  This will be general and abstract, but, as Hart similarly notes throughout The 
Concept of Law, I am developing a theoretical understanding of how concepts of social 
rule-based systems are understood and not the details of any one system in particular.   
 Economic systems are governed by various rules a society adopts, typically 
referred to as ‘economic policy’.  Though not exhaustive, some of these policies govern: 
stabilization, trade, taxes, interest, income, monetary issues such as inflation, economic 
growth, distribution of wealth and government spending.  Given the complexity of the 
economy it is surprising that we can understand part of the concept of particular societies’ 
economies by the (collective overall) content of their rules.  But we can.   
 We will discuss capitalism.  If a society starts creating various rules to govern its 
economy with the goal of increasing wealth, how would it do so?  The society would 
create various rules which are conductive towards increasing wealth, usually with free 
and competitive markets, with privately owned means of production, and wage labor (and 
whatever else is necessary).  The rules, if followed, result in increasing wealth.  So, when 
a society has the motivation to create an economy that produces wealth, they create an 
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economic system which is governed by rules in such a way to do so.  Conceptually, this 
economic system is understood as wealth-building.  As such, we would correctly label it 
‘capitalist’.  That is, if followed, the rules build wealth, which is central to a capitalist 
system, though other criteria (e.g. the means of production are privately owned) are also 
necessary for an economic system to be capitalist.   
 The production of wealth, or more generally capital, is necessary for an economic 
system to be capitalist.  Heilbroner (2008: 689) describes the basics of capitalism in the 
following way: ‘money capital (M) [is] exchanged for commodities (C), to be sold for a 
larger money sum (M’)’ or ‘M-C-M”. This system results in wealth production if 
followed.  Heilbroner goes on to write that M-C-M’ ‘constitutes a prime identificatory 
element for capitalism as a historical genus’ (689, emphases added).  Heilbroner further 
writes: 
The attainment of profit is necessary for the continuance of capitalism not alone 
because it replenishes the wherewithal of each individual capitalist (or firm) but 
because it also demonstrates the continuing validity and vitality of the principle of 
M-C-M’ as the basis on which the formation can be structured.  Profit is for 
capitalism what victory is for a regime organized on military principles, or an 
increase in the number of adherents for one built on a proselytizing religion. (690, 
emphasis added) 
That is, the accumulation of wealth is necessary for there to be a capitalist economy. This 
is further reinforced when he writes: 
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The logic of capitalism ultimately derives from the pressure exerted by the 
expansive M-C-M’ process, but it is useful to divide this overall force into two 
categories.  The first of these concerns the ‘internal’ changes impressed upon the 
formation by virtue of its necessity to accumulate capital – its metabolic 
processes, so to speak. (693, emphasis added) 
And he continues to say that ‘a final attribute of the internal logic of capitalism must also 
be traced to its core process of accumulation’ (693, emphasis added).  We can see 
‘capitalism as a ‘regime’ whose organizing principle is the ceaseless accumulation of 
capital’ (690).   
A capitalist economy is necessarily wealth-building.  This isn’t to say that there 
cannot be periods of time where wealth isn’t increasing (694), but that capitalism is a 
system where wealth is generally built over time (695).  Thus, capitalism’s necessary 
connection to building wealth is a general trend over time and not that wealth is built at 
every moment of time. 
If capitalist economies must themselves produce capital to persist, then a trivial 
implication is that the collective overall content of its rules is necessarily wealth-
building.4  If a country had an economy in which the means of production are privately 
owned, but various rules prevented it from being a wealth-building economy (because the 
rules when followed don’t produce wealth), then it’s not clear it’s a capitalist system 
since wealth production is necessary to capitalism.  If the president of the U.S. declared, 
for example, the U.S. was capitalist but the collective overall content of the economic 
                                                 
4 Note: I make no further claim on whether other social rule-based systems must actually produce certain 
kinds of results in order to persist. My only claim is that they necessarily have certain kinds of collective 
overall content to be certain kinds of systems. 
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rules prevented it from building wealth, we would think the declaration of capitalism 
came too quick.  We would think that due to a lack of wealth production, because of the 
content of its rules, the economic system—while having many of the features of 
capitalism, e.g. the means of production are privately owned—is not quite a capitalist 
system.  Conceptually, it’s no longer clear it is a capitalist economy; we expect a 
capitalist economy’s rules, when followed, to build capital (wealth). The economy will 
no longer be capitalist but, if there is still an economy, will instead be a different kind of 
economy.  
 I next turn towards a very different sort of social rule-based system: hospital 
cleaning rules.  A hospital creates a set of rules to govern the cleaning habits of their 
employees.  The goal of cleaning is to reduce germs.  So, the hospital sets up a set of 
rules on how to best clean the rooms.  The rules, if followed, overall reduce the germs 
and make the hospital safer.  This system is conceptually understood as a germ-reducing 
system.  If so, we would correctly label such a system ‘cleaning rules’.  If the rules 
changed such that when followed they did not overall reduce germs any longer, and 
instead increased the amount of germs, we could no longer correctly label such a system 
a ‘cleaning system’.  To do so would be conceptually confused.  Thus, the collective 
overall content for hospital cleaning rules is necessarily germ-reducing content. 
 An emergency room will usually operate with a rule-based system generally 
called ‘triage’.  The purpose of triage is to ensure that people with the worst illnesses, 
injuries and conditions are treated before less severe cases.  In order to fulfill this, a 
system of rules must be put in place. The rules must, when followed, result in the people 
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with the worst cases of health issues are treated before less significant cases.5  If the rules 
fulfill this task if followed, the system will be correctly labeled ‘triage’. Triages are 
conceptually understood as treat-worst-cases-first systems.  If the rules fail to treat worst 
cases first if followed, then it would be incorrect to call this system ‘triage’.  For 
example, if the rules were designed so that cases were determined randomly, then we 
cannot correctly conceive of the system as a system of triage.  Thus, the collective overall 
content of triage systems is treat-worst-cases-first content. 
 We can imagine a society with a (representative) democracy.  The citizens vote 
for the candidates who are running for office.  The candidate with the majority of votes 
wins.  The system of rules in place for running elections is such that, if followed, they 
result in people’s votes normatively putting a candidate into office.  We would correctly 
label this society ‘democratic’.  But imagine some mischievous politicians who change 
the rules of elections such that, if followed, the votes no longer put a candidate into 
office.  That is, while people can still vote, the votes have no normative force for who 
becomes an elected official.  Instead, politicians themselves choose their own successors 
behind the scenes.  As such, this society would no longer be democratic.  To label this 
society ‘democratic’, even with the necessary (for democracy) voting in place, is 
conceptually confused.  The collective overall content of the rules running the 
democracy—those which, if followed, ensure there are elected officials—are necessary 
for the system to be democratic.   
                                                 
5 If someone is untreatable, even if very ill, they may not be treated.  ‘Treat-worst-cases-first’ should be 
understood as treating the worst cases which can be treated first.  Emergency rooms, accident scenes, the 
S.T.A.R.T. model, etc. all have slightly different ways of handling who gets priority and how so (e.g. some 
divide groups into 4 instead of 3), but they all are in general governed by treating the worst cases that can 
be treated first. 
 11 
 
 The collective overall content of the rules of the above social rule-based systems 
provide certain kinds of results if followed (e.g. capital building and germ reduction).  
What does this have to do with law?  Legal systems are social rule-based systems.  If so, 
they would seem to be analogous to other social rule-based systems in how we should 
correctly conceptually understand them.  So, in such a case, the collective overall content 
of laws’ rules would be one necessary way to correctly conceptually understand law.  
What is the collective overall content of laws’ rules?  One answer is ethical content.  If 
law’s nature is such to produce a society that is (overall) governed in an ethical way, then 
this would mean there is a necessary conceptual connection between law and ethics.   
 When we look at the collective overall content of a society’s rules governing their 
economy, we see that the collective overall content of their rules (in part) tell us the 
correct label, e.g. ‘capitalist’.  If a society that was once correctly labeled ‘capitalist’ no 
longer has rules that are wealth-building (if followed), then it ceases to be capitalist.  
When the hospital cleaning rules (if followed) no longer reduced germs, it ceased to be 
correctly labeled ‘cleaning rules’.  Analogously, if a society’s supposed legal system’s 
rules have, collectively, overall ethical content, then it would be correctly labeled ‘law’ or 
‘legal system’.  Once the collective overall content of the rules are no longer ethical, then 
it would no longer be proper to label the social rule-based system ‘law’ or ‘legal system’.  
Or so I will motivate.  This view is, then, contra the positivist thesis that the existence of 
law is independent of ethics.  I will argue why we might think there is collective overall 
ethical content of legal systems in the next section. 
 The content of each and every rule individually of a society’s (supposed) legal 
system do not need to be ethical.  A country can be labeled correctly ‘capitalist’ even if 
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some of the rules of the economic policy are not wealth-building.  Some rules for a 
hospital’s cleaning rules may not reduce germs, and some may increase them.  What 
matters for our conceptual understanding of these systems are the collective overall 
content of the rules, and not that every rule perfectly fits the correct concept and label.6 
Furthermore, we can distinguish between the intended results of a social rule-based 
system (e.g. building wealth, reducing germs, etc.) and the means in which the system 
utilizes to achieve its necessary results.  So, there may be some rules that are necessary to 
fulfill the result of ethical normativity for legal systems that do not have ethical content 
but this does not show that the overall nature of law is not necessarily connected to 
ethics; it doesn’t show that the rules of the system do not have, collectively, overall 
ethical content. 
 One may think we have a ready-made counterexample to the view of this paper.  
The Nazi regime had a rule-based system—typically considered a legal system—full of 
rules with unethical content.  But this was surely a legal system, one may think.  Let’s 
assume the collective overall content of the rules is unethical, which may or may not be 
the case if we did a full analysis; the rules when followed resulted in overall unethical 
behavior.   
However, this does not necessarily undermine the view since a case needs to be 
built in favor of the supposed counterexample.  And we may be wrong to think that the 
                                                 
6 Whether or not a system with rules that have, collectively, overall ethical content does not necessarily 
imply that it is a system worth having.  Collective overall ethical content does not necessarily imply that the 
system is sufficiently ethical to be a system worth having, that the law is enforced ethically (Raz 1990: 
169), or that it used for ethical purposes. This thesis would then be compatible with the claim that legal 
systems have not ‘always, or generally, been a morally valuable institution’ and that legal systems have not 
‘necessarily been so’ (Raz 2003: 13).  Whether or not a legal system is worth having does not imply that 
there isn’t a necessary connection between law and ethics based on the collective overall ethical content of 
the laws.   
 13 
 
Nazi regime had a legal system.  We could be conceptually confused, which people can 
very well be.  For example, small children may see a small dog and call it ‘cat’.  These 
children do not fully understand what it means to be called ‘dog’.  A more mundane 
possibility is that people may fail to have a correct understanding of a concept by not 
thinking adequately about the issue.  Our tendency to call some rule-systems ‘law’ does 
not mean they really are necessarily law.7 Since we cannot assume without question-
begging that the Nazi regime had a legal system, this matter will require a full analysis at 
another time.  But even if the Nazi’s (supposed) legal system was overall full of rules 
containing unethical content, it does not follow that the view developed in this paper is 
wrong.  It may be that one’s conceptual understanding of law is inaccurate.   
An implication of the view: If Nazi Germany did not have a legal system for 
failure to fulfill the (let’s assume) necessary condition of having laws with collective 
overall ethical content, then there would have been no legal reason to not enter Germany 
prior to the war, whether or not there may have been prudential or ethical reasons to not 
enter. 
 For space considerations, I will not go into a detailed response to any more 
potential counterexamples.  Instead, I will make some general points on the issue and 
then continue on to other matters.  Before deciding on a counterexample to the view 
outlined in this paper, one must answer a few questions affirmatively in order to fulfill 
other necessary conditions for a system to be law.  The first question is ‘does this 
supposed legal system pass all the necessary conditions for a system to be legal system 
                                                 
7 Hart (2012, Ch. X) makes roughly the same point when discussing international law.  I’m not convinced 
my view of saying that Nazi law is not really law is necessarily any odder than saying that international law 
isn’t really law.  And like Hart, I’m not here to adjudicate how we use words like ‘law’.  I’m interested in 
discussing legal theory.  
 14 
 
other than the necessary condition proposed in this paper?’ (e.g. rules of adjudication) 
and the second is ‘does this supposed legal system pass the criteria of the rule of law?’.8  
If the answer to either of these questions is ‘no’, then one’s supposed counterexample 
fails to be a legal system, and thus, cannot be a counterexample to the view outlined in 
this paper.  If the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes’, then we have a potential 
counterexample.  Whether or not the potential counterexample is successful is a 
complicated matter that will depend on the details of the example.  The supporter of the 
view outlined in this paper has several possible responses. The first is that the supposed 
counterexample is not a legal system for failure to have a system in which the collective 
content of the rules are overall ethical (some may take this to be ‘biting the bullet’ but 
that depends on one’s viewpoint and how plausible the counterexample is).  Moreover, 
since merely assuming the supposed counterexample is a counterexample would amount 
to little better than begging the question, one has to give a defense on why the purported 
counterexample is a problem for the supporter of the view in this paper.  The supporter 
could then, second, argue that the supposed counterexample’s defense is wanting.   
Legal systems do have laws with ethical content.  For example, rules against theft 
or murder have ethical content.  Many rules do not.  For example, speed limits regulate 
how fast we can drive but are not necessarily best understood as good or bad.  We may 
think that the limit is set too high or low but that does not necessarily seem to have 
anything to do with good or bad, right or wrong.  Rules such as these are acceptable on 
my view.  They do not affect the collective overall ethical content of the system since 
they have no ethical content.  I suspect some will think that this may undermine my view 
                                                 
8 On whatever account is the correct one, say Fuller’s or Raz’s account.  See footnote 9 for details.   
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that the collective overall content of legal systems’ rules is ethical since many laws are 
this way.  But it need not.  These laws may be best understood as having a practical aim 
free of ethical content.  Yet, it may be the case that there is a necessary connection 
between the concepts of law and ethics and a necessary connection between law and 
practical aims. Though, practical aims may support ethical ones.  It is not obvious that 
laws with practical aims are free of ethical content since they are created with various 
purposes in mind, such as saving lives.  However, this is not the place to discuss such 
matters.  The view is compatible with necessary connections besides those of ethics and 
for there to be laws free of ethical and unethical content.   
Another possibility is that what matters is not that a law’s content is ethically 
good overall, but rather if it is ethically acceptable or not.  The implication of utilizing 
‘ethical acceptance’ is that laws without ethical content may still be considered ethically 
acceptable. In this case, law requires rules with collective overall ethical-acceptability 
content.  A social rule-based system that has rules with collective overall ethical-
acceptability would be, on a similar view, correctly labeled ‘law’ or ‘legal system’ and 
one that does not have such collective overall content would not be correctly labeled 
‘law’ or ‘legal system’.  The system in this case would be guiding its constituents to act 
in a way that is ethically acceptable, rather than ethically good.  
  Putting to the side the possibility that it may be better to frame the view as based 
on content with ‘collective overall ethical acceptability’, I’ll assume for practical 
purposes the view that the collective overall content of a legal system’s rules is ethical.  
This is compatible with laws without ethical content, as noted above.  But it is also 
compatible with unethical laws as well.  We can imagine a society with a legal system 
 16 
 
consisting of a total of 400 laws. A certain number of these laws will have no bearing on 
its collective overall ethical content.  Let’s assume this number is 100.  Of the 300 
leftover laws, 200 may have ethically good content.  100 may have ethically bad content.  
As we can see, the collective overall content of the laws is ethically good.  And so, this 
social rule-based system would be correctly labeled ‘law’ or ‘legal system’, according to 
the view.   
 However, simply counting the number of good versus bad laws is not enough to 
fully understand if a supposed legal system has rules with collective overall ethical 
content.  Different laws may have a different ethical ‘weight’ to them.  To say a law X 
has a higher ethical weight than another law Y, is to say that what X bans is more heinous 
than what Y bans or that what behavior X encourages is ethically superior to what Y 
encourages.  For example, a law banning murder has a high ethical weight, while a law 
requiring the use of seatbelts has a low ethical weight, if at all.  An ethical law such as 
one banning murder significantly outweighs an (let’s assume) unethical law that bans the 
excessive use of salt in potato chips. So, it’s possible for a legal system to have a higher 
quantity of laws with unethical content than one’s with ethical content if the system’s 
laws with ethical content have collectively more weight than the one’s with unethical 
content.  This system would have rules with collective overall ethical content.  We may 
note further that laws without ethical or unethical content—that is, ethically neutral 
content—would have no ethical weight to them.  Thus, they would not influence the 
ethical weight of the system, and therefore are compatible with the view.   
 The view in this paper states that the rules of a legal system must have, 
collectively, overall ethical content in order to be a legal system.  This is analogous to 
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how the rules of a capitalist society must have its economic rules with collective overall 
wealth-building content.  As noted in the introduction, to say that a rule has ethical 
content, as I use ‘ethical content’, is (roughly) that the rule, if followed, produces good 
behavior, whether or not it uses ethical language, though it may in numerous cases.  But 
what might some of these rules be?  Some rules of a legal system which have ethical 
content include: laws banning murder and theft, laws requiring children to be taken care 
of (child support, anti-abuse laws), laws requiring animals to be treated humanely, anti-
stalking laws, laws banning mutilation and torture, laws ensuring fair treatment at work 
(e.g. anti-discrimination laws), laws protecting equality in general, due process 
(fundamental justice), laws protecting privacy and property, laws maintaining standards 
of living, laws prohibiting lying, deception and libel under various circumstances, 
etcetera.   
Other rules which may have ethical content, but I suspect will be more 
controversial, include: laws regulating traffic, laws regulating flights, some divorce laws 
such as spousal support, laws requiring/protecting primary and secondary education, rules 
avoiding Fuller’s eight ways to fail to have a legal system,9 (some, maybe not all) 
procedural law, etcetera.  Most of these rules discussed between this and last paragraph 
protect life, liberty, and livelihood and surly life, liberty, and livelihood are goods.  In any 
                                                 
9 I’m only suggesting that legal systems which avoid Fuller’s worries will help support the collective 
overall ethical content of the rules. I am not suggesting that these rules on their own are sufficient to 
support a necessary connection between ethics and law, or that evil regimes will or will not have reason to 
comply with them in order to rule unethically (for more on these issues, see e.g. Kramer 2004a and 2004b; 
Finnis 2011: 273-74; Raz 1979; Simmonds 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007; and Stewart 2006).   
 
Fuller (1996: 21) requires the following to avoid failing to create law: there must be rules, rules must be 
available to the public, there shouldn’t be retroactive legislation, the rules should not be contradictory and 
should be understandable, people should be able to follow the rules, the rules shouldn’t change very often, 
and the rules should be enforced as stated (for a similar list as Fuller’s see Raz 1979: 214-18).  
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case, this covers a significant amount of the laws and they do seem to be guiding society 
towards ethically good (acceptable) behavior.  I am not implying that any of these rules 
are individually necessary or sufficient for there to be a legal system, nor necessary or 
sufficient for the system to have, collectively, overall ethical content.  
The Ethical Content of Legal Systems’ Laws 
In this section, I discuss why one may believe the collective overall content of legal 
systems’ rules is ethical.  It is possible that the collective overall content of legal systems’ 
rules may be something other than ethical, but I focus on ethical content here since it’s a 
plausible option and the literature helps support the claim.  The motivation for social 
rule-based systems can help inform us what the collective overall content of the rules are.  
When people create a system, such as a capitalist economy or hospital cleaning rules, 
they have a goal that the rules are meant to guide people and their means towards.  So, 
when people decide that wealth is their goal, they will try to create rules which help 
produce this wealth.  If cleanliness is the goal, people will try to create rules which help 
guide behavior towards cleanliness. So, it is reasonable to think that the motivation 
people have when creating a social rule-based system tend towards creating rules that 
fulfill the nature of the motivation. Though, it may not be necessarily true, for example if 
people fail to understand what kinds of rules are needed for their goals.   
If I can give reason to think that people are interested in creating a system 
(purportedly a legal system) that guides people’s behavior in ethical ways—or otherwise 
want laws that have ethical content—then this provides grounds for thinking that law has 
collective overall ethical content.  If law has collective overall ethical content, then law 
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would be guiding society to act ethically.10  Of course, we shouldn’t confuse purposes 
with the content.  For example, though capitalist economic rules may be motivated by 
ethical concerns, the collective overall content of such a system’s rules is clearly not 
ethical content.  Moreover, a capitalist economy may contingently produce good results, 
but it is not necessary; a capitalist economy necessarily has rules that produce, if 
followed, capital.  We shouldn’t confuse the motivation(s) for a system, or contingent 
results, with the necessary content of the rules themselves, even if the motivation gives 
good reason to understand what the collective overall content will likely be.  
Nevertheless, the motivation for a system gives good grounds for a prima facie 
justification of the collective overall content of a system. 
 The idea that people create societies for the purposes of some good can be found 
as early in philosophy as Aristotle (and, possibly, Plato’s Republic11).  Aristotle writes 
that 
Observation shows us, first, that every polis is a species of association, and 
secondly, that all associations are instituted for the purpose of attaining some 
good—for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, 
in their view, a good.12 (Politics I.1: 1252a1) 
Aristotle wasn’t talking about law specifically, however, his view is that people create 
many associations, i.e. ‘all associations’, towards something that is, in some sense, good.  
Law will plausibly fit into this view since law is a sort of association.  Even if not, it’s not 
                                                 
10 One may think that if the motivation for law is ethical, then there is a necessary conceptual connection 
between law and ethics, and so, in Simmond’s phrasing, law may be a ‘moral idea’.  I won’t pursue this 
possibility in this paper. 
11 Thanks to Jon McGinnis for pointing this out. 
12 Cited in Finnis 1985: 76. 
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implausible to think Aristotle would be sympathetic to the view that law is created for a 
good.  ‘Good’ is ambiguous and can mean many different things.  Nevertheless, one good 
is ethics and, if so, we would have prima facie reason to believe ethics is a motivator for 
the creation of law.   
 More recently, Hart has suggested that law is motivated by ethical considerations.  
Here is one instance of this: 
Thus, it cannot seriously be disputed that the development of law, at all times and 
places, has in fact been profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality 
and ideals of particular social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral 
criticism urged by individuals, whose moral horizon has transcended the morality 
currently accepted.13 (Hart 2012: 185) 
If one is motivated by ethical considerations to create law, it’s unlikely one will fail to 
make (at least some) rules which do have ethical content.  I’ll turn to this next.   
At the inception of a legal system certain rules need to be created.  Hart calls this 
the ‘minimum content of natural law’.  As Hart notes, ‘given survival as an aim, law and 
morals should include specific content’ (Hart 2012: 193).  This specific content, which 
Hart believes is the result of ‘obvious truisms about human nature’, namely the need for 
survival, are rules that ‘contain in some form restrictions on the free use of violence, 
theft, and deception’ (91, similar and broader points are noted on 172 and chapter IX, 
especially pages 193-200).14  The free use of violence, theft, and deception are bad.  
                                                 
13 I will briefly discuss the implications of moral anti-realism, and, thus, conventional morality, later in the 
paper. 
14 Finnis (2003) concludes that laws that ban such things are needed for moral reasons.  
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Laws forbidding them are good.  It would be difficult to believe otherwise.  We may also 
note that nearly all societies see life as a good which should be preserved (Finnis 2011: 
82-83), which these kinds of laws help ensure the preservation thereof.  These laws have 
ethical content. 
If legal systems must have this sort of content at the inception of them, then it’s 
unlikely any actual legal system began with rules that were collectively overall unethical, 
especially if law’s purpose is ethical.15  Once the legal system is in place, it would be 
correctly labeled ‘law’, assuming it passes all other necessary criteria to be law.  Since 
the collective overall content of the rules is ethical, ‘law’ would be necessarily connected 
with ethics, assuming the analogy holds.  We could of course conceive of the rules’ 
content becoming (collectively) overall unethical over time, but the view can 
accommodate this.  Let’s look again at an earlier analogy.  Following a rule-based system 
for cleaning initially reduces germs.  Once the rules are changed and following them 
results in overall increasing the amount of germs it would no longer be correct to label 
the system ‘cleaning system’.  Similarly, legal systems begin with rules with collective 
overall ethical content.  Once, over time, the rules have collective overall unethical 
content, it would no longer be correct to label the system ‘law’.   
As Green succinctly notes in the introduction to The Concept of Law, Hart 
endorses the claim ‘it is not just a contingent matter that law and morality both regulate 
human conduct’, that the purpose of law is ethical in nature, and that there is a connection 
between law and justice (in Hart 2012: xxxiii-xxxiv).  The idea that the purpose of law is 
to guide behavior in an ethical manner, that we must consider ethics for law to be action 
                                                 
15 Shapiro (2011: 391) claims law has ethical goals. 
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guiding, or for an ethical end is not new.  So far, I’ve been discussing how the ethical 
purpose for law helps give reason to think that the rules of legal systems have, 
collectedly, overall ethical content.  One complication for this view, noted by Green, is 
that while the purpose of law may be for ethical normativity that does not necessarily 
mean the system fulfills that purpose (xxxv). But on this paper’s view, legal systems may 
necessarily do so.  On this view, legal systems only exist while the collective content of 
their rules are overall ethical, beginning at the inception of the legal system.  Once the 
collective overall content of the rules fail to be ethical content, it’s no longer correctly 
called a legal system.  (Though, as noted in footnote 6, the collective overall content may 
be ethical for a legal system, but may not be ethical enough to warrant judging the system 
as worth having.) 
What if a society’s purposes for law are many (or that people believe there are 
many purposes, see Finnis 2011: 4)?  Even if law has many purposes beyond ethics, that 
does not mean we should cease to conceptualize a necessary connection between law and 
ethics based on the collective overall ethical content of the rules.  The view holds that the 
collective overall content of the laws themselves (partly) determine the concept of law 
and not that the purpose for law does.  So, while the purpose of law can help us identify 
the collective overall content of laws it does not necessarily tell us how we ought to 
conceptualize law.  For example, there may be many purposes for an economic system 
labeled ‘capitalist’ but that does not mean we would cease to have a capitalist economy 
just because of the many purposes it may have.  This is because the collective overall 
content of the economic rules partly determines what kind of economy the society has.   
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Furthermore, purposes may come apart from the collective overall content of rules 
and therefore how to conceptualize a social rule-based system.  We can imagine people 
creating rules with the intent to create a capitalist economy but instead, due to the 
collective overall content of the rules and who own the means of production, fail to do so, 
however unlikely this may seem.  We shouldn’t confuse the purpose for systems with the 
conceptual understanding of them even if purposes help us identify the correct conceptual 
understanding of the systems.  Ultimately, it’s the collective overall content of a social 
rule-based system’s rules that is necessary to correctly conceptualize the system, 
according to the view in this paper.16   
 Few would deny the importance of ethical considerations for adjudication17 or 
when creating, applying, and enforcing laws.18  These kinds of ethical considerations are 
compatible with positive law theory19 and natural law theory explicitly advocates for their 
importance (e.g. Finnis 2003, 2011; and in some ways, though not a naturalist, Dworkin 
                                                 
16 It’s not clear if the view in this paper is a functional kind view of law.  A necessary connection between 
law and ethics based on the collective overall content of the rules only requires that law has certain 
necessary content, not a particular end, contra the functional kind view’s requirement of a ‘distinctive end 
that law serves’ (Moore 2000: 328).  The collective overall ethical content of law has the effect that law, if 
followed, guides society’s behavior in accordance with ethics.  I’m fine with the claim that the ethical 
content of law is ethical content simpliciter, especially since ethics in general is an interest to law’s 
constituents and that (at least likely) no particular ethical content is necessary or sufficient, but we can also 
invoke Finnis’s view of the common good.  As Moore (2000: 321) succinctly summarizes that view: ‘(1) 
the good of co-ordinating conflicting individual goods for mutual benefit, (2) the good of co-ordinating 
individual goods when doing so has intrinsic merit (as in play), and (3) the good of co-ordinating when that 
realizes the goods of friendship and love’.  (Or the content may be justice-guiding.)  Whether or not the 
common good or ethically guided behavior simpliciter constitute an end for the view in this paper is unclear 
since content is understood in terms of the results of rules if they’re followed, and not that they must 
achieve a particular end.  And unlike the functional kind view (Moore 2000: 295, 300, 303-304), the view 
here allows that there can be unjust, unethical laws.  If the view developed in this paper is a functional kind 
view of law, it would likely be due to the assumption that law is analogous to the other social rule-based 
systems discussed and that those systems are functional kinds.   
17 Gardner (2012c: 268) argues that there is a necessary connection between adjudication and justice.  
Finnis (2011: 179) concurs.  
18 As Gardner (2012b: 190) puts it: ‘there are moral norms governing [legal practice’s] conduct’. 
19 Green (2008: 1050-52) believes law is necessarily ‘justice-apt’; Orrego (2007) notes the variety of ways 
positivists accept the importance of ethical considerations in law, concluding—perhaps surprisingly—that 
the (supposed) positivist theories reviewed by him are in fact natural law theories. 
 24 
 
1986).  Ethical considerations are abundant and always a consideration for the lawyer, the 
law maker, the judge, and those who have to decide whether not to follow the law.  I am 
not noting this to suggest that the importance of ethical considerations for laws 
necessarily establishes a necessary connection between law and ethics in regard to the 
collective overall content of law’s rules on its own.  Rather, I am noting it to point that if 
ethical considerations are always so important to the participants within a legal system, 
then we should expect that the content of the legal system’s rules to be, collectively, 
likely overall ethical as well since their interests are embedded within their actions in the 
system.  They have a strong interest in creating laws with ethical content.  We then have 
reason to believe many laws do in fact have ethical content. 
There are many functions of law.  Some them are, or may be, (1) ‘preventing and 
encouraging behavior’, (2) ‘providing facilities for private arrangements’, (3) ‘providing 
services and redistributing goods’, (4) ‘settling unregulated disputes’, (5)‘procedures for 
changing the law’, and (6) ‘procedures for enforcing the law’ (Raz 1979: Ch. 9, 176).  
The purpose of this list isn’t to debate whether it is exhaustive or mistaken.  Rather, these 
are plausible candidates for some of the functions of law.  These functions, and so rules 
which regulate them, will not only result in regulating behavior but will also seem to 
result in people acting ethically if other rules have, collectively, overall ethical content.  
That is, if legal systems have, collectively, overall ethical content, then these functions 
will help reinforce ethical normativity.  They do so not because these functions 
themselves are on the face of it ethical in nature, though they may be, but because these 
functions help ensure that people act in the ethical manner the laws regulate.  While these 
functions are not sufficient on their own to support a necessary connection between ethics 
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and law, they help ensure that the laws these functions regulate guide behavior in an 
ethical manner if those laws have ethical content.  So, these functions reinforce or 
support the ethical content of the laws.20  In doing so, the rules regulating the functions of 
law would seem to have ethical content since they themselves regulate good behavior, 
though indirectly by supporting laws with ethical content.   
Legal Validity 
I will focus on Hart’s view of legal validity given his works importance on the field and 
the literature, and my general sympathies with it.21  The (ultimate) rule of recognition 
provides the criterion (criteria) for identifying which rules properly count as laws for 
particular legal systems (by belonging to that system) and, so, for a rule to be a valid law 
(103-6).  In a simple society, the rule of recognition may be a list of rules the society’s 
constituents regularly follow, or, in a more complex society, the rule of recognition may 
be that the rules were created by a specific law-making group (94-95).  As Hart notes, it 
is possible for a legal system to utilize ethical criteria as part of its rule of recognition 
(though some, such as Raz and Gardner, disagree), which Hart notes that the U.S. may be 
such a case (204), but it’s not necessary for the rule of recognition to utilize ethical 
criteria.  I agree that laws do not need to (individually) pass a criterion of ethicality in 
order to be legally valid, nor do I disagree that laws are created by human persons.  This 
                                                 
20 To say that functions play a role in supporting the content of the rules isn’t to say that the functions are 
necessary or sufficient for a necessary connection between law and ethics for the view in this paper.  
Moreover, if the collective overall content of the rules is no longer ethical, then these functions may still 
exist in some sense, there just would no longer be law, according to the view in this paper.  A similar point 
can be made about the rule of law in Fuller’s sense, which may allow the possibility for Fuller’s desiderata 
to exist in some sense when the collective overall content is no longer ethical as many, such as Kramer, 
insist.  The rule of law may be used for evil ends.  Again, there would just no longer be law according to 
the view in this paper even in that case, assuming the collective overall content is no longer ethical, which 
it would seem likely to be if people use law for evil purposes.  
21 Though Hart’s view of validity and the rule of recognition isn’t without some controversy (e.g. Raz 
1979: ch. 8; Shapiro 2011, which Kramer (2014) responds to), my response will be of general interest. 
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isn’t problematic for the view I have outlined since the questions ‘how are laws 
validated?’ and ‘is there a necessary connection between law and ethics?’ are 
distinguishable questions.22   
However, this does not mean that the view being developed does not have 
anything important to say about what counts as law.  As noted before, when a social rule-
based system correctly labeled ‘law’ on this view starts to have laws that have, 
collectively, overall unethical content, it would fail to be a legal system.  What this 
implies is that there are ethical standards that the rules as a whole must fulfill in order to 
be properly called ‘laws’.  The standard is that they must have, collectively, overall 
ethical content, even though no particular law, or maybe only a few (the ‘minimum 
content’ thesis), may need to have ethical content.  So, while ethical criteria are not 
necessary for a particular rule to be a valid law, the collective overall ethical content of 
the social rule-based system’s rules is necessary for the rules to be laws.  So, ethics would 
then seem to play what we may say is an indirect role in validating rules as laws.  An 
ultimate rule of recognition may be necessary for a rule to be a valid law, but if so, it 
would not be sufficient on the view here since the system must have collective overall 
ethical content, as well. 
A complication is that it is unclear at what point a particular system’s rules are 
collectively overall unethical, and so whether or not there is a legal system, and thus 
laws.  This implies a vagueness as to when there are or aren’t laws.  There is, however, 
on nearly any view some lack of precision on exactly when a system is a legal system or 
                                                 
22 Similarly, Gardner (2001: 224) and Finnis (2003: 127) note that we can separate the questions of ‘is this 
really a law?’ and ‘what is law?’. Positivism focuses on the former question of validity, while natural law is 
more focused on the latter; one may answer the former with a positivist answer, while still holding a natural 
law theorist’s answer to the latter with consistency.   
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not since any criteria given may only provide us with a ‘central case’ of law, i.e. one 
where it is clear that there is a legal system (Finnis 2011: 276-81). But nevertheless there 
may be ‘non-central cases’ which may lack some of the criteria but which still seem to be 
largely law.  This may imply for my view that some (possible) legal systems have what 
we might label ‘quasi-laws’ or laws in which their validity comes in degrees.  Even so, 
it’s not clear this is problematic since vagueness in general does not necessarily provide 
reason to think a distinction isn’t legitimate (e.g. the difference between a living and dead 
organism, whether or not a country is or isn’t capitalist, etc.).  
Let’s turn to natural law and validity.  The view should be placed in comparison 
to what natural law theories have generally said about validity.  Murphy (2003) 
distinguishes several kinds of readings of natural law: the ‘strong reading’ and the ‘weak 
reading’.23 The strong reading says that any rule that fails to provide reason for 
compliance fails to be a law because law’s nature is such that it provides reason for 
compliance (244).  The weak reading says that law is a kind in which providing reason 
for compliance is a feature, and so, particular laws which fail to have this feature are 
defective (253).  An analogy to make this clearer: It’s a feature of the kind ‘lion’ to have 
sharp teeth for hunting, and so, a lion without teeth is a defective lion.  A broken phone is 
a phone, though it is defective as a phone.  Neither reading represents the view developed 
in this paper.  According to the view in this paper, no particular laws fail to be law 
individually for failing to live up to certain principles of reasonableness for compliance in 
contrast to the strong reading, nor does my view say any particular laws are defective 
laws, as in the weak reading.  All the view states is that when there are legal systems, and 
                                                 
23 I ignore the uninteresting ‘moral reading’. 
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so laws, the collective content of the system’s rules are overall ethical and, if not, then 
there is no legal system and, so, no laws.24  
Moral Anti-Realism  
One advantage of legal positivism is that it can accommodate moral anti-realism, the 
view that there are no objective moral truths, since laws are validated in terms of social 
facts, rather than (objective) moral facts.  Though positivists can accept the utilization of 
ethical thinking for various purposes such as adjudication, they are not committed to 
moral realism for such purposes.25  On the other hand, natural law is generally perceived 
as holding, or requiring (Moore 2000: 295), moral realism, and thus an extravagant 
metaphysics (at least by some naturalists’ standards).   
How does the view outlined in this paper respond to the possibility that moral 
anti-realism is true?    If it is true, does that undermine the view?  Not necessarily, though 
it might need some amendment.  The view could be made compatible with the claim that 
there is a connection between the concepts of law and ethics, and not there is a necessary 
connection between the truth or reality of ethics and law, whatever that may mean.  For 
there to be a necessary connection between the concepts of law and ethics does not 
require moral realism to be true; it’s compatible with moral anti-realism.  We can 
conceive of morality as an idea.  We all do conceive of, say, murder as an immoral act 
and conceive of a law banning murder as ethically good; whether or not murder is 
                                                 
24 This seems to be what makes my view here descriptive in contrast to most natural law theories (more on 
this later). Though, Murphy (2003: 264) thinks that explaining how a law can be defective, under the weak 
reading, is necessary for a complete descriptive account of law. 
25 Of course, positivism is a theory of how laws are validated (Gardner 2001: 199-201).  A positivist could 
hold that there are necessary connections between law and ethics on other theoretical issues besides legal 
validity.  As Green (2003: section 4.3) notes: ‘no legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist’.  
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objectively wrong is a further matter.  A version of the view can accommodate a 
necessary conceptual connection between the concepts of law and ethics alongside moral 
anti-realism.   
 It is perfectly coherent to conceive of a necessary connection between correctly 
labeling a society capitalistic and that their economy’s rules (if followed) build wealth.  
That is, let’s say that if the economy’s rules, if followed, don’t build wealth, it would 
never be correct to label that particular economy ‘capitalist’.  It makes little sense to ask 
if there is an objective truth about the economy building wealth.  The rules which guide 
an economy towards wealth are overall understood conceptually (i.e. wealth-building).  
Concepts need not be either true or false.  A concept, wealth-building, forms the basis of 
our concept or idea about the nature of capitalism.  There may be a necessary connection 
between capitalism and wealth-building but we need not ask the further question if 
wealth production is objectively true or not.  Wealth is conventional.  Likewise, all the 
view needs to claim is that there is a necessary connection between the concepts of 
(conventional) ethics and law.  It does not make sense to ask if there is a fact of the 
matter about ethics where ‘ethics’ here should be understood as a (conventional) concept 
in the way wealth-building is.  The view need not make any claim about the nature of 
ethics itself beyond it as a concept.  Since laws that ban murder are conceived of as 
ethically good, correctly so given what ‘murder’ and ‘good’ mean, an anti-realist 
approach to ethics is largely compatible with the view outlined in this paper.  Whether or 
not it’s plausible is a further matter beyond the scope of this paper.26 
                                                 
26 For example, if relativism is correct, this might entail that a legal system like ours and ones like the 
Nazis’ are both law relative to each society’s moral code (their concepts of ethics) if their legal systems 
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Descriptive Methodology 
Hart (2012: 240) writes: ‘my account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no 
justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the 
forms and structures which appear in my general account of law’.  So, Hart believes he 
can describe the general structure of legal systems qua legal systems without resorting to 
any claims about the ethical import law has, or should have, nor whether or not one is 
obligated to follow the law (or a law).  Though some do not believe legal theory can be 
done descriptively in this way (e.g. Finnis 2011), I am not here to debate such an issue.  
I’m interested in whether the view sketched in this paper fulfills the criteria Hart has 
provided.  
 Natural law theories tend to deny Hart’s descriptive methodology.27  But it would 
seem the theory developed here does not deny descriptive methodology.  While I do 
claim there are rules with ethical content, I do not state whether or not it is good that we 
have those laws (though it is), whether we should have them or not (though maybe we 
should).28  Instead, my claim is that legal systems have laws with collective overall 
ethical content, which informs us of the necessary connection between law and ethics.  
The argument developed in this paper does not attempt to justify the existence of legal 
systems or particular rules as good or not, nor would it seem that by explaining how the 
collective overall content of the rules informs the nature of law do I fail to be ethically 
neutral in any interesting sense.  That is, while I may recognize particular laws as having 
                                                                                                                                                 
have rules which are collectively overall ethically in line with the corresponding society’s moral code, an 
odd, but coherent, view. 
27 See Langlinais and Leiter (forthcoming) for an overview of legal theory’s methodological issues. 
28 Here’s an example of a potential law with ethical content but which, for various reasons, we would not 
want to posit: it is an offense to cheat on your boyfriend or girlfriend. Interestingly, it may not be good to 
create such a law, though this may just be a prudential concern. 
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ethical content, I do not thereby necessarily fail to be ethically neutral in attempting to 
describe the nature of law and laws, whether or not there is a necessary connection 
between law and ethics.  It might be that a correct description of law requires recognizing 
that there is a necessary connection between law and ethics based in collective overall 
ethical content.   
A Counter-Argument 
Earlier in the paper I stated that we should (partly) conceptualize economies by the 
collective overall content of their rules.  I discussed the economic system called 
‘capitalism’.  There is a general feature of a society, the economy, and that feature has 
multiple kinds (e.g. capitalism and socialism).  And those kinds are understood in 
different conceptual ways.  One might argue that we should understand legal systems in 
an analogous way.  That is, there is a feature of a society called ‘legal system’ of which 
there are multiple kinds: one with rules with collective overall ethical content are one 
kind of legal system and another kind are legal systems that do not have rules with 
collective overall ethical content.  Call the former ‘ethicalist’ and the latter ‘non-
ethicalist’.   
It would seem, then, that like how there are many kinds of economies there may 
be many kinds of legal systems.  If so, an ethicalist legal system would persist until the 
collective overall ethical content of the rules ceases to be; a non-ethicalist legal system 
would persist only as long as the collective overall content of the rules is not ethical.  
This seems to imply that once a system is not ethicalist, we would have a different kind 
of legal system.  There would remain a legal system but it would not be the same legal 
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system in the same way that when an economy switches from a capitalist one to a 
socialist one it ceases to be the same economy.  This is interesting.  It would imply that 
there is a kind of legal system which is necessarily ethical in nature since the persistence 
of it would depend on the collective overall ethical content of the rules.   
However, if this is correct, it would pose a problem for the view developed 
throughout this paper since it would no longer be inconsistent with the positivist claims 
that the existence of law does not depend on the collective overall ethical content of the 
laws and that laws can be valid in spite of having collective overall unethical content.  
This is so, because even if a kind of legal system is necessarily ethical in nature 
(ethicalist), this does not imply that all kinds are (non-ethicalist).  There are economic 
systems and then there are kinds of economic systems; there are legal systems and then 
there are kinds of legal systems. 
 There is a way for the proponent of the view in this paper to respond to this 
objection.  When it came to hospital triage system there were not many kinds of triage 
systems, in the sense that all of them require that worst cases are treated first.  If the 
system failed to govern the order of cases seen by worst to less worse, then it was not a 
triage system.  So, some social rule-based systems do not have many kinds.  So, the 
existence of law can be argued to operate in the same way.  This possibility can be 
reinforced by a further consideration.  As many have pointed out before (e.g. Finnis 
2011: 24, XII.4; Hart 2012: 208; Murphy 2003: 253-4), a single law which is defective as 
law—that is, a law which is heinous enough so that it cannot be reasonably followed or 
applied—would fail to be normative.  Imagine a whole (supposed) legal system that 
consists of overall defective rules in this way.  This would seem to be the non-ethicalist 
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system.  If people have no reason to follow, and so don’t follow, the rules of the system 
by and large, it’s not clear we should think of it as a legal system since legal systems are 
normative systems (which isn’t to say that law must be coercive).  The non-ethicalist 
system would not seem to be law.29  Both the ethicalist and non-ethicalist systems are 
rule-based systems in some sense but it’s not clear they’re both legal systems, nor even 
that the non-ethicalist system is a social system given its failure to guide people’s 
behaviors. Though it’s somewhat controversial if the rule of law can or can’t be separated 
from law’s existence,30 it is a plausible response which supports the coherence of the 
view outlined in this paper.31   
Conclusion  
I have developed a view of the necessary connection between law and ethics which is 
plausible and coherent.  On this view, legal systems, in order to be correctly labeled 
‘legal system’ or ‘law’, must contain rules that have, collectively, overall ethical content.  
Once the rules do not overall fulfill this nature, the system fails to be law.  I have drawn 
an analogy between legal systems and other social rule-based systems and utilized a 
motivation for law, ethics, in order to justify this necessary connection between the 
concepts of law and ethics.  Though I have not argued for the truth of the view, I have 
argued that if the view is correct, the view is descriptive, compatible with moral anti-
                                                 
29 Simmonds (2005: 63-4; 2007: 46) makes a similar point, concluding that ‘law rules to the extent that it 
exists as law’. See Hart (2012: 103-4) as well.  
30 See Raz (1979: 212-14) and Simmonds (2005: 63-66; 2007: 46-56) for discussion. For recent related 
discussion on whether the rule of law—in Fuller’s, Kramer’s, and Simmond’s sense—can be used for 
unethical ends, see the work of Kramer (2004a, 2004b), Simmonds (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), and Stewart 
(2006).  
31 We can also take the anti-realist approach where the necessary connection is between law and 
conventional ethics.  More specifically, law necessarily has rules with collective overall conventional 
ethical content.  A holder of this can respond that what some might perceive as a non-ethicalist system is 
ethicalist relative to the society it belongs to and, so, there is only one kind of legal system for every 
society: ethicalist. 
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realism, and has important implications on when a rule-based system purported to be law 
is, in fact, law.   
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